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Introduction
The announcement on October 29, 2013 by the British Prime Minister that the United Kingdom will soon be the first country outside the Islamic world to issue sukuk has reaffirmed the increasing interest in this Islamic mode of financing. Over the past decade, Islamic finance has registered an impressive growth, with worldwide Islamic financial assets rising from USD 150 billion in the mid-1990s to USD 1.6 trillion by end of 2012 (Di Mauro et al., 2013) .
This remarkable growth was spurred not only by the proliferation of Islamic banking but also by the extensive development of sukuk, the alternative mode of financing to conventional bonds that is compliant with shari'a or the Islamic legal code. A widening market for sukuk is driven by investors' demand for securities in accordance with their religious beliefs or by constraints faced by Islamic financial institutions on permissible investments. By end of 2012, the value of outstanding sukuk was USD 229.4 billion (with new issues amounting to USD 131.2 billion), representing 14.6% of global Islamic financial assets (Di Mauro et al., 2013) . Malaysia accounts for the largest sukuk market with 74% of issues in 2012, but these securities are also commonly issued in Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries.
Sukuk are investment certificates that can be issued by sovereigns and corporations and which exhibit similarities and differences with conventional bonds. Similar to bonds, sukuk have a maturity date and sukuk holders receive a regular stream of income (fixed or variable) over the life of the certificate along with a balloon payment at maturity.
However, in contrast to bonds, the value of sukuk does not rest on the creditworthiness of the issuer. Instead, this financing instrument represents undivided ownership in tangible assets, usufruct, or services of revenue-generating issuers, with the underlying asset necessarily being shari'a-compliant in both nature and use. Sukuk prices can then vary both with the creditworthiness of the issuer and with the market value of the underlying asset. Further, the certificate value that is repaid at maturity should reflect the current market price of the underlying asset and not the original amount invested.
In spite of the rising interest in sukuk investments, research to appraise their growth implications remains limited. A notable exception is the work by Godlewski, TurkAriss, and Weill (2013) on the comparative stock market reaction to the announcements of both sukuk and conventional bond issues in Malaysia. This study finds that the stock mar-ket is neutral to the announcement of conventional bonds but that investors react negatively to the announcement of sukuk, notwithstanding excess demand from Islamic financial institutions that makes it easier to sell these instruments. The negative implications of sukuk issues are attributed to possible adverse selection considerations, as borrowers with the lowest return expectations may favor the issuance of profit-and-loss sharing sukuk structures over conventional interest-based bonds.
However, it is possible for factors other than borrower characteristics to influence the stock market reaction to sukuk issuance, including two very distinct features that define them and which we address in this paper.
First, sukuk structures can be structured following debt-based or equity-based principles. Debt-based instruments such as ijara (rental/lease agreement) and murabaha (cost-plus sale) pay a predetermined rate of return to investors and are thus less eulogized under shari'a compared to equity-based investments. 1 However, these structures are permissible because they do not contain stricto sensu interest. In contrast, equity-based investments follow profit-and-loss sharing principles of musharaka and mudaraba, which are partnership contracts in which the financier and entrepreneur share profits based on pre-agreed ratios whereas losses are commensurate to their contribution (financial or physical) to the partnership. While being a preferred mode of financing, sukuk based on partnership contracts have been criticized by a prominent shari'a scholar in 2007 for not being de facto structured along the lines dictated by shari'a principles. In light of their shari'acompliance questionability and since these instruments are likely to suffer from the adverse selection mechanism described by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2013) , these sukuk may generate a negative stock market reaction in comparison to debt-based instruments.
Second, sukuk structures undergo a strict screening process by religious advisors to ensure their shari'a compliance. These instruments must notably be free from prohibitive elements such as riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty), maysir (gambling), but also from non-permissible activities (e.g., investments in pork, pornographic, entertainment, drugs, and military activities). More importantly, sukuk certification is of prime importance to investors who must ensure that these securities are compliant with shari'a before purchasing them. Hence, the audit quality of shari'a can influence the investor reaction to sukuk issuance, with better quality issues sending a positive signal on the ability to trade 1 There are also shari'a restrictions on the tradability of murabaha sukuk. Understanding how sukuk characteristics influence stock market reaction has broad implications for the industry. First, identifying value-enhancing sukuk characteristics will help shape the design of these instruments to favor better firm market valuation. Since shari'a certification by reputable scholars comes at considerable cost, it is of major interest to investigate whether shari'a scholar reputation exerts a positive influence on firm valuation following sukuk issuance. Second, such evidence would also give insights about the evolution of sukuk in the future. Namely, the finding of a better investor reaction to Ijara sukuk in comparison to other sukuk types would suggest increasing domination of this type of sukuk in the future.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. 4 We, therefore, hypothesize that longer tenure proxied by a larger number of sukuk issues endorsed by a shari'a scholar, is expected to reduce information asymmetry about the shari'a audit quality and hence have a positive effect on firm returns.
H2:
The longer the tenure of shari'a scholars, the greater the CAR for the sukuk issuer.
Further, when a sukuk issue is approved by a large number of shari'a scholars, a positive signal is likely to be conveyed to the market in the sense of congruence or uniformity of the pronouncement on the acceptability of the financial instrument. The importance of shari'a congruence is evident in the delays in issuance of liquidity instruments by the recently established International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation in Malaysia, which has seen a reduction in shareholding membership thereby conveying lack of consensus on product acceptability (Najeeb and Ibrahim, 2013) . Under these conditions, when more scholars affix their names to a sukuk issue, we expect that market participants will be more confident that the newly-issued investment vehicle is in compliance with shari'a. We postulate the following:
The larger the number of shari'a scholars endorsing a sukuk issue, the greater the CAR.
In addition to auditor tenure and product acceptability, a growing literature documents that geographical proximity between agents improves economic outcomes by lowering information asymmetry (DeFond, Francis and Hu, 2011; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011) . Choi et al.
(2012) find that shorter geographic distance between auditor and client improves audit quality, despite possible concerns about auditors' objectivity. In our case, when the shari'a scholar is located in the same country as the sukuk issuer, we expect information asymmetry between the client and the auditor to be reduced, thereby positively influencing investors'
perception about the quality assurance of the Islamic financial instrument. Shari'a scholar proximity to issuer is in fact of key importance to the acceptability of a sukuk issue in light of disagreements on religious pronouncements across countries and regions. We formulate our next hypothesis as:
H4: When the majority of shari'a scholars reside in the same country as the issuer, the sukuk issuer is likely to experience greater CAR. reputation of shari'a scholars hired to screen sukuk matters and we formulate our hypothesis as follows:
The better the reputation of shari'a scholars, the greater the CAR for the sukuk issuer.
Finally, the characteristics of shari'a scholars can influence the stock market reaction to issuance of a certain sukuk type. In particular, the signaling effect of shari'a scholars' certification can be more important for Islamic financial instruments which are considered more suspicious in terms of shari'a compliance. We formulate our last hypothesis as:
H6: Greater tenure, number, reputation, and proximity to issuer of shari'a scholars have a more beneficial influence for non-Ijara sukuk.
Empirical strategy
In this section, we first present the methodology used to compute abnormal returns and the subsequent multivariate analysis. Then, we describe the data collection and management process and present some descriptive statistics.
Methodology
We use a standard event study methodology to compute the abnormal returns of listed companies that issued sukuk in order to investigate the impact of scholar certification on firm value.
We first identify event days as the sukuk issue announcement date from the Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server (Bloomberg), or day 0. We exclude from our sample all contaminated dates, i.e. when another major event occurs for the issuing company (such as an earnings call, sales release or analyst, investor or shareholder meeting) two days before and two days after day 0. We also drop all the clustered amendments when different events for the same company occur within a range of two days from one another as we would not be able to isolate the effect of sukuk announcement on the company's return in such conditions. This conservative procedure reduces considerably the sample size.
Next, we follow Fuller et al. (2002) for a suitable estimation method of abnormal returns in a multi-event setting. In our sample, we include companies that have issued several consecutive sukuk in different countries. We estimate abnormal returns using a modi-fied market model defined as = − , where is the return on company i and is the market index return 5 . Since our sample includes sukuk issues from different countries, we account for the multi-country setting by using national market indexes as represented by the main stock market index in each country (Campbell, Cowan and Salotti, 2010) . 6 We use the AR to compute cumulative abnormal returns CAR over five-day and three-day periods ([-2, 2] and [-1,1]) and consider them to be proxies for shareholder value.
We then perform regressions of the cumulative abnormal results on a set of explanatory variables including sukuk and shari'a scholars characteristics and other control variables. We use OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the sukuk level.
We test several specifications including various combinations of explanatory variables, always including industry and year fixed effects in all regressions.
Data
In order to test empirically our main hypotheses we collect data on shari'a scholars, sukuk issues at origination, issuers' stock price, and stock market indices. We begin by extracting all available information on Scholars from the Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server (Bloomberg hereafter) using the ISLM <GO> function from the start of the database until March 7 th , 2013. The initial dataset contains information on the scholar's name, country of origin, name and ticker of the issuing company, and the ISIN of the sukuk. We obtain the names of 57 scholars who certified 368 sukuk issued by 106 companies. Next, we retrieve information on the characteristics of the sukuk at origination such as the amount issued, coupon, date of announcement and issuance, maturity, type of sukuk, and country of issuer.
We are able to obtain this information for 367 sukuk. Finally, we gather stock market information for 54 of the issuers. Owing to our conservative procedure for the identification of events and data availability regarding stock market prices, our final sample contains 131 sukuk issues by 43 companies. The time span of our sample runs from 2006 to 2013 and covers eight countries.
Since our objective is to investigate whether scholar characteristics and sukuk type influence stock market reaction to sukuk issues, we define variables to take into account such dimensions. To test our six hypotheses, we account for scholar characteristics using We also include four control variables that are issue-specific. Coupon is the coupon of sukuk in percent. Maturity is the maturity of sukuk in years, while log(Amount) is the natural logarithm of the sukuk amount in million USD. As many observations come from Malaysia, we control for the potential influence of the environment of this country by including a dummy variable Malaysia equal to one if the issuing firm comes from this country. Finally, we control for the number of previous sukuk issues by the issuer (Previous Sukuk). Table 1 shows sample composition by issue year, issuer country, type of sukuk, and industry sector. We note that the most active year for sukuk issuance was 2012 with more than 62% of sukuk in our sample being issued during that year. In terms of the origin of the issuer country, Malaysian firms represent the majority of our sample (almost 85%).
Companies operating in the financial, utilities, industry, and consumer industry sectors also account for most of our sample. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables, which are defined in the appendix. We observe that the five-day event window average CAR equals to 0.05% with a large standard deviation (above 5%) and that its median is negative. The shorter event window average CAR [-1,1] is negative (-0.22%) with a lower standard deviation but also has a negative median. Major sukuk types in our sample are of Ijara (44%) and Musharaka (37%) types, followed by Murabaha (13%). Thus, debt-based sukuk account for 57% of the sample.
The average number of scholars certifying an issuer's sukuk is equal to 3. Geographical proximity between scholars and issuers seems important as, in more than half of the sample, at least one scholar is from the same country as the issuer. On average, half of the team of scholars is from the same country as the issuer. Scholars appear to be experienced, as a typical scholar certifies on average 24 sukuk per year or almost 75 issues over 3 years. Scholar-issuer relationships are not very common, although in 20% of the cases at least one scholar has already certified an issuer in a previous year. Regarding the financial characteristics of sukuk, the average coupon is above 4%, maturity is 8 years, and the average amount issued is 1,270 million USD with a large standard deviation. Finally, issuing firms are active having issued in the past, on average, more than 11 bond issues.
Results
We present the results of our analysis in this section, starting with the main estimations, and followed by additional regressions using an alternative classification for sukuk types as well as conducting robustness checks.
Main estimations
We perform regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on a set of explanatory variables including sukuk types and scholars characteristics. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the [-2,2] event window. It is also in line with the explanation suggested by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill (2013) that an adverse selection mechanism may contribute to favoring a negative stock market reaction. Indeed, Ijara is a debt-based instrument that is not based on profit and loss sharing principles; hence, it does not suffer from the possibility of attracting borrowers of poor financial condition as would a Musharaka instrument. In two estimations that include an interaction term between Ijara and scholar characteristics, the coefficient on Ijara is not significant, probably due to the correlation resulting from having between both terms in the same regression.
Second, we observe that the coefficients on Mudaraba and Murabaha are not significant in all estimations. Therefore, stock market investors do not react differently to these types of sukuk compared to Musharaka. It is interesting to observe that the only sukuk type that provides a better market reaction compared to Musharaka is the most commonly used structure of Ijara.
Third, we find that two scholar characteristics significantly influence the stock market reaction in a positive manner: Reputation and Proximity. However, Number of scholars and Tenure are not significant determinants of cumulative abnormal returns.
These findings suggest that investors react to some but not all features of sukuk issues related to the certification by shari'a scholars. Thus, the results lend support for hypotheses H4 and H5, but tend to reject hypotheses H2 and H3.
The importance of the choice of scholars in terms of reputation and geographic proximity with the issuer has implications for the design of sukuk issues, regardless of their structure. The finding on reputation is of particular interest in view of the high fees paid for the services of the most well-known shari'a scholars. Our finding provides some evidence that high compensation for reputable shari'a scholars certifying sukuk may be justified on the grounds of better valuation of issuing firms.
Fourth, the analysis of the interaction terms shows very few significant interactions between scholar characteristics and sukuk type. Among the twelve tested interaction terms, only three are significant, suggesting that scholar characteristics may not influence much the cumulative abnormal returns across different types of sukuk. The three exceptions are as follows.
The interaction between Tenure and Ijara is significant and negative. Associated with the positive and significant coefficient for Ijara, this interesting result suggests that the positive impact of issuing Ijara is weaker when certifying scholar tenure is higher. In other words, greater shari'a tenure may not generate cumulative abnormal returns for these sukuk. Furthermore, the interaction between Tenure and Murabaha is positive and significant, implying that stock market investors react more positively to these sukuk when they are endorsed by scholars of higher tenure. Both these findings provide limited support to hypothesis H6. Finally, the interaction between Proximity and Ijara is positive and significant, suggesting that proximity is more valued for Ijara than for other types of sukuk. It seems that reduced information asymmetry between the certifying advisors and the sukuk issuer matters for stock market investors when it comes to Ijara structures.
Additional estimations
In our main estimations above, we distinguished among all sukuk types omitting Musharaka and including dummy variables for all three other sukuk types. We further test whether our main findings are maintained when we group sukuk types in two broad categories:
profit-and-loss sharing instruments and debt-based instruments. In addition to serving as a sensitivity test of our main results, these additional estimations are of particular interest to examine whether stock market investors differentiate among the two broad categories of sukuk, in line with the argument of the adverse selection mechanism.
We estimate the regressions of cumulative abnormal returns for the [-2,2] event window by including a new explanatory variable Debt, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the sukuk structure is either Murabaha or Ijara, and zero otherwise. We show the estimations results in Table 4 , from which several conclusions emerge.
The key finding from with the finding that Ijara issues associate with a better stock market reaction than
Musharaka, it provides a more general view of the different stock market reaction to both categories of sukuk. It seems that stock market investors react negatively to the issuance of profit-and-loss sharing sukuk in comparison to debt-based sukuk, albeit the spirit of Islamic finance is to encourage equity and not debt-like investments. We explain our finding using the adverse selection mechanism according to which borrowers in better financial condition have fewer incentives to opt for the sharing of expected profits.
Further, we find similar results for the scholar characteristics as in the baseline regressions. Reputation and Proximity exert a positive impact on stock market reaction, while Number of scholars and Tenure do not significantly influence cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, this finding is robust to the dual classification of sukuk types.
Finally, the results on the interaction terms between Debt and scholar characteristics show only one significant coefficient, Debt and Proximity, which accords with the previous finding on the significant and positive interaction term between Ijara and Proximity.
It suggests that greater proximity between shari'a scholars and the issuing firm is positively valued by stock market investors when a debt-like sukuk is issued, due to reduced information asymmetry. We also note that including interaction terms generally lower the significance of Debt, due to the correlation of these terms with the Debt variable.
In sum, our main results are not sensitive to this alternative classification of sukuk structures.
Robustness checks
We check the robustness of our results in two different ways. First, we test whether they are sensitive to alternative definitions of scholar characteristics. We replace Reputation, defined as the maximum number of sukuk certified by one of the shari'a advisors in the last year, with three other variables -Reputation (Max, 3 years), Reputation (Mean, last year) , and Reputation (Mean, 3 years), respectively, for the maximum number of issues certified over the past three years and the average number of issues certified over the previous year and the last three years, respectively. We also replace Proximity, defined as the percentage of scholars from same country as the issuer, with DummyProximity, a dummy variable that is equal to one if one at least scholar is from the same country as the issuer.
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who have previously certified one former sukuk of the borrower, with DummyTenure, a dummy variable that is equal to one if at least one scholar has certified a former sukuk issue of the borrowing firm in the past.
We report the results of the alternative regressions in Table 5 , including the sukuk type variables (columns 1-3) and considering Debt variable (columns 4-6). We find that our main results are maintained. Ijara is significantly positive in the three first estimations
and Debt is significantly positive in the three last estimations. The alternative variables for reputation and proximity are also significant and positive in most cases. Hence these results corroborate our main findings on the impact of reputation and tenure on stock market reaction to sukuk issuance.
Second, we consider cumulative abnormal returns over the [-1,1] event window instead of the [-2,2] event window. The choice of the event window might indeed influence the results as a shorter event window can exert an influence on cumulative abnormal returns. We report the results in Table 6 by also considering separately different sukuk types or using the Debt variable. Our main findings are not affected by the length of the event window. Ijara and Debt are respectively positive and significant. Only two scholar characteristics are positive and significant, Reputation and Proximity.
Conclusion
We examine how the stock market reaction to sukuk issues is influenced by key features of this shari'a-compliant instrument, using the event study methodology on a sample of listed companies from eight countries.
We obtain several findings. First, we uncover that Ijara sukuk favors a positive stock market reaction. We attribute this result to both the lower shari'a compliance risk of Ijara compared to other structures and to the adverse selection mechanism uncovered by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2013) that hampers the issuance of profit-and-loss sharing sukuk. Second, we provide evidence on a beneficial influence of reputation and proximity of scholars on stock market reaction to sukuk issuance. However, we do not find support for the view that all scholar characteristics matter, as neither the number of scholars endorsing the issue nor their tenure are found to be significant. Third, we find very limited evidence that the importance of scholar characteristics varies by sukuk type. Therefore, both the choice of sukuk structure and scholars hired for its certification matter for the market valuation of the issuing firm. Our findings support the view that the market premium paid for shari'a scholar reputation and proximity with issuer may be justified. However, the certification requirement should not overprice having a large number of scholars involved or their tenure, as these factors are not associated with a significant premium in terms of market valuation.
Our findings provide important insights for the expansion of sukuk markets across different countries. They suggest that Ijara structures may benefit the most from the expansion of sukuk markets because of the better investor reaction to them compared to other structures. One of the constraints for Ijara sukuk expansion, however, is its requirement in terms of existing assets that could be relaxed looking forward to finance new assets. The findings also suggest that investors attach value to the selection of scholars with certain characteristics. Future research may address further whether the (sometimes criticized) high compensation of shari'a scholars certifying the legality of sukuk is justified by the accompanying positive firm valuation by investors. Tables   Table 1  Composition of the sample   This table provides Previous Sukuk = number of previous sukuk issues by issuers 29
